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I. INTRODUCTION
The rise in political fortune of Arnold Schwarzenegger and other
foreign-born citizens has invited a re-examination of the purposes, costs,
and benefits of the Constitution’s eligibility qualifications, contained in
Articles I and II of the Constitution.1 While those provisions contain
express eligibility requirements, Article III imposes no similar
qualifications for potential members of the federal judiciary. Hence,
questions about the proper eligibility constraints on the Article III judges
go unasked and unanswered. Limiting the discussion to the first two
†
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1
See, e.g., Michael Tager, Constitutional Reform and the Presidency The Recent
Effort to Repeal the Natural-Born Citizen Requirement, 39 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 111,
126 (2009) (arguing that “it makes eminent sense to amend the Constitution to allow
naturalized citizens to run for president”); Editorial, The Schwarzenegger Amendment,
N.Y. SUN (Sept. 2, 2004), http://www.nysun.com/editorials/schwarzeneggeramendment/1223/ (arguing that the justification of the birth-citizen qualification in
Article II is no longer plausible); Hendrik Hertzberg, Strong Man: Arnold
Schwarzenegger and California’s Recall Race, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 29, 2003, at 44
(reporting on Orrin Hatch’s attempts to introduce a twenty-eighth amendment that would
eliminate the birth-citizen qualification).
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Articles excludes a potentially crucial source of insight: the reasons
underlying Article III’s silence on eligibility qualifications. This article
evaluates eligibility qualifications generally by focusing on the omission
of eligibility qualifications from Article III. What distinguished the
judiciary from the other two branches and prompted the Framers to omit
eligibility qualifications from Article III? The answers to this question
sheds new light on the wisdom of eligibility qualifications in Articles I
and II, as well as the nature of the federal judiciary.
A review of the historical record provides no direct explanation for
the Article III omission of eligibility requirements. Whether the
omission was the result of simple neglect or shrewd foresight, history
confirms the wisdom of that choice. In fact, eligibility qualifications in
the federal judiciary would be superfluous if not harmful.2
But the question remains: why would the Framers include eligibility
qualifications in only two of the three branches of America’s fledgling
government? After all, many of the reasons underlying eligibility
qualifications in the presidency and Congress appear to apply with equal
force to the judiciary. The age minimums in Articles I and II, for
example, were designed to block the succession of political offices from
fathers to unproven sons.3 In the eighteenth century, however, connected
families dominated the judiciary as much as they did the other two
branches. Members of the judiciary also enjoyed life tenure and were
placed on the bench by peers,4 thus underscoring the potential usefulness
of eligibility constraints in Article III.
Yet there were good reasons not to impose eligibility requirements
on the judiciary. For all it shared with the other two branches at the end
of the eighteenth century, the judiciary was exceptional in ways relevant
to eligibility qualifications. First, the judiciary was designed as a passive
branch of government. Limited to interpreting laws created and executed
by Congress and the president, Article III judges possessed less power to
abuse than members of the other two branches. Second, America’s
federal and state constitutions included ample jury provisions. Unlike a
national legislature or executive, the Framers had experience with a jury
system that successfully constrained errant judges. Third, before the
doctrines of judicial review5 or legal skepticism6 gained credence, judges
2

See infra Part III.
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 158 (2005).
4
U.S. CONST. art. III, §1.
5
See generally EDWARD SAMUEL CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75–
78 (1914) (describing evolution and acceptance of judicial review in the nineteenth
3
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in the eighteenth century were thought to perform a more limited,
technical function. Fourth, the judiciary’s displacement from democratic
pressures may have strengthened rather than weakened the need for
eligibility qualifications.
Part I of this article examines the eligibility qualifications in the
first two Articles, and the justifications underlying those qualifications.
Part I also explores how those justifications would apply to the judiciary.
Part II describes some exceptional aspects of the judiciary that may
explain the omission of eligibility qualifications from Article III. Part III
assesses the impact of the lack of eligibility requirements, briefly
reviewing America’s experience with Article III judges.
II. ARTICLE III: A PRODUCT OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Article I restricts Congress to representatives of at least twenty-five
years of age who have been a United States citizen for seven years and
live in the state they represent.7 Article II limits the presidency to United
States citizens at least thirty-five years old, who were born and resided
for at least fourteen years in the United States.8
The eligibility qualifications serve populist goals, as lineal
entrenchment of political office lingered in America’s fledgling
democracy. Akhil Reed Amar has described the goals of the eligibility
qualifications as the promotion of a “democratic culture of republican
merit and equal opportunity.”9 The age minimum ensured that sons of

century); William E. Nelson, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution of
the Constitution Theory in the State, 1790–1860, 120 U. PENN. L. REV. 1166 (1972)
(same).
6
See generally LAWRENCE MEIR FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 114 (2d ed.
1985) (describing “fundamental change in the concept of law” following the American
Revolution, in which “a new set of attitudes developed [that] the primary function of law
was . . . to be a utilitarian tool [protecting] property in motion or at risk rather than
property secure and at rest”); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW 1870–1960, at 25 (1977) (describing growth of legal thought from its “blind
veneration for ancient rules, maxims, and precedents”).
7
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not
have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the
United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he
shall be chosen.”).
8
Id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen...shall be eligible
to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not
have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within
the United States.”).
9
AMAR, supra note 3, at 160.
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famous families would not unfairly benefit from their birth status.10 In
the fifty years before independence, for example, more than 70 percent
of New Jersey’s elected representatives had family ties to past
representatives.11 In response, the Framers designed the age minimum to
grow a republican society open to worthy people of humble origins.
The birth-citizen qualification also aims to safeguard democratic values.
The Framers reserved the presidency and vice presidency for natural
born citizens in order to secure the offices from capture by foreign
Similarly, the residency provisions ensured that
monarchs.12
representatives actually had substantial connections to the region they
represented. Unlike the property qualifications in England and some
state constitutions,13 the eligibility qualifications in the Constitution
appear to advance democratic ends even if they limit the scope of
democratic choice.
The eligibility qualifications in Articles I and II evince the founding
generation’s distrust of centralized government. Each corresponds to the
experience under, and appearance of, corrupt English rule. The age
requirement reflects an aversion to England’s hereditary monarchy and
the custom in provincial America of lineal succession of government
office from fathers to sons.14 The residence qualification embodies the
American experience an ocean away from their government: a nonresident president or congressman would bear an uncomfortably similar

10

Id. Age minimums trace back to 180 B.C.E. in the Lex Villia Annalis, a body of
Roman law which included age minimums for senatorial magistrates. THOMAS
BROUGHTON & MARCIA PATTERSON, THE MAGISTRATES OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 388
(1951).
11
GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 84 (1991).
12
JAMES BAYARD, A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
96 (2nd ed., F.B. Rothman & Co. 1992) (1833) (“Were foreigners eligible to the office, it
would be an object of ambition, or of policy, with foreign nations to place a dependent in
the situation. . . .”). The Framers appreciated the over-inclusiveness of the birth-citizen
rule at least to the degree that they carved out an exception for those who were citizens at
the time of the Constitution’s adoption. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; BAYARD, supra, at
96 (explaining that the exception was “justly due to those men who had united
themselves with the fate of the new nation, and rendered eminent services in achieving its
independence; and is, necessarily, of limited continuance.”).
13
H.T. DICKINSON, Popular Politics, in A COMPANION TO EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
BRITAIN 105 (H.T. Dickinson ed., 2002) (describing property qualifications in eighteenth
century Britain).
14
See WOOD, supra note 11, at 84 (1991). For example, in the fifty years preceding
the Declaration of Independence, over 70 percent of New Jersey representatives elected
into office were related to earlier representatives. Id. at 48.
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appearance to the reign of King George III.15 Article II’s birthcitizenship qualification, although seemingly illiberal,16 barred the next
European nobleman from America’s highest office.17
Eligibility qualifications in the state constitutions at the time of the
federal document’s ratification reflect similar democratic goals. Of the
thirteen colonies that would comprise the United States in its infancy,
four included age minimums18 and four included residency provisions19
of varying terms of length for their legislatures and executive officer.
That no states imposed birth-citizen requirements on their executive
office also appears reasonable as the threat of a foreign monarch
15

See generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 15 (U.S. 1776) (“He has
combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and
unacknowledged by our laws. . . .”). The residency qualification can be justified on
simple efficiency grounds as well—it would eliminate the otherwise considerable time
political figures spent travelling from their office to their home. See, e.g., id. at para. 6
(“He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant
from the depository of their Public Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into
compliance with his measures.”).
16
Akhil Reed Amar has defended the birth-citizen requirement to the extent it
“represented a considerable liberalization of eighteenth-century English practice.”
AMAR, supra note 3, at 164. Unlike England’s 1701 Act of Settlement, which barred
naturalized foreigners from serving in the Privy Council or Parliament, the U.S.
Constitution restricted only the highest executive offices to citizens of foreign birth. Id.
17
Evidence suggests that some Philadelphia delegates had contacted Prince Henry of
Prussia to explore the possibility of the prince serving as America’s constitutional
monarch. See LOUISE BURNHAM DUNBAR, A STUDY OF “MONARCHIAL” TENDENCIES IN
THE UNITED STATES, FROM 1776 TO 1801, at 54–75 (1922); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE
GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 42–50 (1972).
18
DEL. CONST. art. IV, IX (setting a minimum of twenty-five years of age for
members of “[t]he council” but not members of the “House of Assembly” or the
“President” of Delaware); MD. CONST. §XXX (setting a minimum of twenty-five years of
age for Governor); N.C. CONST. §XV (setting a minimum of thirty years of age to be
eligible for the position of Governor but no minimum for any representatives); VA.
CONST. art. IV (setting a minimum of twenty-five years of age for any Senator but not for
Governor or the House of Delegates). Other states set age minimums for office at the
voting age and thus have not been counted as having age eligibility qualifications
comparable to those in the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. VI, IX (setting a
minimum of twenty-five years of age to both vote and hold political office in Georgia).
19
N.C. CONST. arts. V, XV (each member of the Senate and House must reside in
their district for one year and the Governor must have resided in the North Carolina for
five years); PA. CONST. § 42 (every elected position requires a candidate have resided in
Pennsylvania for two years); S.C. CONST. art. X (every elected position requires a
candidate have resided in South Carolina for one year); VT. CONST. art. XI (every elected
position requires a candidate have resided in Vermont for two years). The remainder of
the states required either candidates for office to either be a resident eligible to vote or
said nothing at all about residency qualifications. See e.g, N.Y. CONST. art V (requiring a
citizen to have resided in the state for six months in order to vote but not mandating that
candidates for office actually reside in New York).

60

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 6:55

assuming executive power over a single state presented less of a threat to
sovereignty than in the presidency. And, reflecting their federal
counterpart, states omitted age, residency, and citizenship qualifications
from judiciaries.
The states, however, were not entirely silent on judicial eligibility
qualifications. New York mandated retirement at sixty years of age for
any state judge but did not set age minimums for any state office.20 An
age maximum reflects an entirely different concern than a minimum—
namely, that judges would subvert democracy on account of the
vicissitudes of old age rather than youthful inexperience. More
importantly, the maximum suggests that at least some states deliberated
over qualifications for the judiciary just as they did for the legislative and
executive branches. Given states’ presumed attention to this issue, it is
significant that New York’s age maximum remains the only judicial
eligibility qualification in the first United States government—state or
federal.
The absence of eligibility qualifications in the judiciary is striking
because the concerns underlying the qualifications in the legislative and
executive organs apply as forcefully in the judicial context. In 1771, two
of Massachusetts’ five justices on its highest court had fathers who had
sat on the same court, and a third was the previous chief justice’s
younger brother.21 The familial associations in the Massachusetts court
were by no means anomalous among courts.22 The highest court in
South Carolina, for example, had similar family connections among
succeeding justices.23 Including John Jay, Bushrod Washington, James
Iredell, and John Marshall, many early Supreme Court justices had close
family ties to judges and politicians.24 Indeed, most early justices, as
well as the majority of judges appointed in 1789, came from privileged
backgrounds.25 Yet even though a select gene pool dominated state and
federal judiciaries just as it dominated legislative and executive offices,
20

N.Y. CONST. art. XXIV (“[T]he judges of the supreme court, and the first judge of
the county court in every county, hold their offices during good behavior or until they
shall have respectively attained the age of sixty years.”).
21
PETER E. RUSSELL, HIS MAJESTY’S JUDGES: PROVINCIAL SOCIETY AND THE
SUPERIOR COURT IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1692–1774, at 52 (1990). One of these sons would
be followed on the court by his son, and, on net balance, nine of ten justices on the court
between 1746 and 1772 had family ties to others who served on the court. Id.
22
See id. (providing South Carolina’s highest court as an example of family ties
among judges in state courts).
23
Id.
24
AMAR, supra note 3, at 219.
25
Id.
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the Constitution placed no eligibility constraint on the selection of
federal judges.26
The nature of federal judicial service also suggests a need to protect
the judiciary from unfit candidates. The Constitution grants Article III
judges life tenure on condition of good behavior.27 Life tenure endows
judges with a much greater degree of protection from political
accountability than the president or members of Congress. The
appointment process further removes the judiciary from popular
feedback mechanisms.28 The presidency and membership in the Senate,
offices held in four and six year terms, respectively, place judges on the
federal bench without any formal input from the House of
Representatives. Hence, democratic accountability is more diffuse in the
third Article than in the other two, which may suggest the greatest need
for eligibility qualifications among the three branches.
Early Americans were not especially pleased with the performance
of the country’s judges. Popular dissatisfaction with the perceived
arrogance of America’s initial judges grew into a movement toward an
elected judiciary.29 Randolph Jonakait has reported that every state as of
1845 had appointed judges, yet on the eve of the Civil War, two-thirds of
states elected judges to lower courts and nearly as many states elected
judges to their Supreme Courts.30
Similarly, evidence beyond the four corners of the Constitution
suggests the Framers cared about who would serve in the judiciary.
England’s Star Chamber haunted the formation of America’s judiciary.
Initially conceived as a remedy for corruption in the feudal jury system,31
the Star Chamber operated as a court until 1641 and gained notoriety for
its judges conducting secret and politically motivated proceedings
against foes of the Crown.32 A primary goal that emerged in
26

The family ties are relevant to age and residency qualifications because they
facilitate the placement of candidates in office on account of their kin rather than merit.
Less worrisome is the birth-citizen requirement because a foreign monarch sitting on the
federal judiciary would be constrained by other Article III judges and the limited role of
applying laws created by the other two branches in particular disputes.
27
U.S. CONST. art. III, §1.
28
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to . . . appoint . . . Judges of the Supreme Court. . . .”).
29
RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 31 (2003).
30
Id. at 32.
31
SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
170–179 (1883).
32
See id. at 337–57; SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE GENIUS OF THE COMMON LAW 66
(1912). The 1765 landmark opinion in Entick v. Carrington emphasized the judicial
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Constitutional debates was preventing the judiciary from devolving into
“America’s Star Chamber.”33 The Framers even incorporated this goal
directly into the Constitution; the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition of
“compelled testimony” is commonly interpreted in reference to the Star
Chamber’s inquisitorial method.34 Although corrupt judges led these
“English inquisitions,” the Framers did not include any constitutional
protection over who would preside in America’s courthouses.
Congress did, however, implement judicial qualifications by statute.
In the Judiciary Act of 1789, the First Congress required lower federal
court judges to reside in the district or circuit for which they were
appointed.35 The residence requirement likely served the same purposes
as it did in Article I—that is, removing the need for judges to travel long
distances between their court and home and inspiring public confidence
by having a person with local ties serve as a public official. The latter
rationale prompts the question of why the founding generation would be
concerned about the appearances of impropriety in the federal judiciary,
but not enough to include any similar provision in the Constitution.
After all, the First Congress passed the Act nearly two years before
enacting the Bill of Rights.36 The Framers thus likely thought about
including judicial eligibility qualifications in the Constitution or first ten
amendments, yet demurred. On what basis might they have left such an
omission?
III. THE EXCEPTIONAL JUDICIARY
Any attempt to ascertain the intent of the Framers is fraught with
hazard, especially when the object is an omission without an
accompanying deliberative record. One cannot, for example, entirely
corruption plaguing the Star Chamber in its avowal “to demolish this monster of
oppression, and to tear into rags this remnant of Star Chamber tyranny.” 19 Howell’s
State Trials 1029 (1765). The United States Supreme Court supplies some background:
“[T]he Star Chamber has, for centuries, symbolized disregard of basic individual rights.
The Star Chamber not merely allowed, but required, defendants to have counsel. The
defendant’s answer to an indictment was not accepted unless it was signed by counsel.
When counsel refused to sign the answer, for whatever reason, the defendant was
considered to have confessed.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821–822 (1975).
33
II THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 635 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
34
See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 595–98 (1990).
35
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §3, 1 Stat. 92 (“That there be a court called a District
Court, in each of the afore mentioned districts, to consist of one judge, who shall reside in
the district for which he is appointed. . . .”).
36
U.S. CONST. amends. 1–10 (ratified 1791).
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rule out the possibility that the Framers intended to include eligibility
qualifications in Article III but simply forgot.37 But the lack of direct
evidence is not fatal to an understanding of why the Framers left the
president and Senate free to appoint whomever they wished to the federal
bench. Based on indirect evidence, as well as the text surrounding the
Constitution’s ratification, a number of possible justifications for the
omission emerge. Viewed inclusively, the evidence suggests the
Framers deliberately—and wisely—omitted eligibility qualifications
from Article III.
The Constitution tailors eligibility qualifications to the nature of a
particular branch of government. For example, only Article II includes a
birth-citizen requirement. The election of a foreign monarch to the
presidency posed a real danger to America’s nascent government; but no
similar danger existed from a foreign monarch joining Congress. A
foreign monarch seeking to usurp American government by sitting on the
federal bench poses less danger than one sitting in Congress. The
omission of the birth-citizen requirement in Article III thus prompts no
further explanation.
Although not as evident as the birth-citizen qualification, the
residency and citizenship qualifications in Articles I and II appear illsuited to the judiciary as well. Residence requirements were designed to
reduce travel costs and cultivate at least an appearance of a connection
between public officials and their constituency.38 The judiciary assumes
a relatively inconspicuous position in government. As elected officials,
presidents and members of Congress have a strong interest in making
direct, visible appeals to their constituents. Federal judges do not share
this institutional incentive. Article III appointees rely on the president
and Senate for investiture, and their confirmation proceedings typically
garner minimal fanfare. Appearances thus count for much less in the
political qualifications of judges than in those of elected representatives.
The emphasis in America’s adjudicative model on detached
neutrality rather than advocacy contributes further to the judiciary’s
isolation from the public. The impartial settlement of disputes, however
intractable, rarely place federal judges in the public’s eye. Judicial
proceedings
stress
procedural
regularity
over
charismatic
pronouncement. The relative obscurity of the judiciary thus undercuts
37

Although this possibility cannot be completely ruled out, the absence of judicial
eligibility qualifications in state constitutions all but compels the inference that the
omission in the federal constitution deliberately followed this pattern.
38
See supra note 10.
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the need to have residence qualifications to cultivate the appearance of
the connection between a federal judge and their constituency.39 And,
unlike members of Congress, federal judges do not travel as an essential
part of their official duties, thereby undermining the need for residency
qualifications.40 The Framers also likely appreciated that travel costs
would decrease over time, and thus inserted residency qualifications in a
statute41 that could be revised by a mere majority of Congress rather than
in America’s founding document.42
In one sense, we are now left to reconcile the age qualification
against Article III. Yet, in another sense, the age minimum constitutes
the tip of the iceberg of potential eligibility qualifications. The Framers
were not limited to four types43 of eligibility qualifications in writing
Article III—they could have fashioned qualifications unique to the
judiciary just as they did for the presidency. Age qualifications serve as
a touchstone for the universe of unwritten eligibility qualifications,
because in 1787, the same immediate concerns with lineal succession
that justified age minimums in Articles I and II also pertained to Article
III. Accordingly, the omission of age qualifications in Article III
prompts a deeper inquiry into the nature of the judiciary relative to the
other branches. This analysis thus turns to a more general appraisal of
the aspects of the judiciary that warranted omitting from Article III both
the qualifications in Articles I and II and any other qualification.
A. The Judiciary as a Coordinate Branch
The Framers may have perceived little need for eligibility
qualifications in Article III because they saw the potential abuse of
39

See supra note 13.
To be sure, federal judges “rode circuit” as part of their duties in America’s years.
See Steven G. Calabresi & David C. Presser, Reintroducing Circuit Riding: A Timely
Proposal, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1386, 1391 (1996) (describing practice of circuit riding as it
existed in the years immediately following ratification). They did not, however, have de
jure or de facto obligations to return to a district they represented, like the members of
the House of Representatives and the Senate.
41
See Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 35.
42
Lawrence Lessig has elaborated on aspects of the Constitution tailored to
accommodate technological innovations. Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of
Innovation, 51 DUKE L.J. 1783, 1794 (2002) (describing the purpose of the “progress
clause” of the Constitution as to give Congress authority to grant “authors” exclusive
rights for their “writings” for a “limited time” to “promote progress”).
43
The four eligibility qualifications present in the Constitution include: (1) birthcitizenship; (2) citizenship; (3) residency; and (4) age minimums. The total absence of
eligibility qualifications in Article III implies that a president had authority to nominate a
foreign citizen to the Supreme Court.
40
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power in the judiciary as less potent than in the other branches.44 The
relatively small threat posed by federal judges warranted fewer measures
to guard against judicial abuse. In defending the guarantee of life tenure
to federal judges, Alexander Hamilton wrote that “the judiciary, from the
nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political
rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy
or injure them.”45 The judiciary lacks such a malignant capacity because
it wields no influence over the “sword or the purse” of government.46
Further, the judiciary had substantially less influence in the
eighteenth century than it did in later centuries. The Supreme Court
would not issue collective authoritative opinions but instead followed
English custom where each justice offered his own reasoning and spoke
solely for himself.47 The doctrine of judicial review had yet to gain
purchase,48 and enforceable substantive due process rights did not exist.
And only in the late twentieth century did the Court assert itself as the
“ultimate interpreter” of the Constitution.49 Confined to adjudicating the
particular dispute before its courts, judiciary exercised an inherently
limited power. These limits help explain why the Framers were willing
to forgive the potential dangers of life tenure and the absence of
eligibility qualifications.
B. The Role of the Judiciary’s “Lower House”: The Jury
Perhaps even more importantly, America’s judicial system includes
a limiting mechanism without parallel in the other branches: the jury.
Few political institutions were held in as high regard as the jury system
in the late eighteenth century.50 Indeed, the Framers viewed juries as a
44

See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton, Examination of Jefferson’s Message to Congress of
December 7, 1801, no. XIV (Mar. 2, 1802), in 8 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
246, 249 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904) (arguing that the judiciary was inevitably the
weakest branch of government because it could “ordain nothing”).
45
THE FEDERALIST, No. 78, at 223 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed.,
1981).
46
Id.
47
AMAR, supra note 3, at 216.
48
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
49
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (using the phrase “ultimate
interpreter” for the first time in Supreme Court history); see also Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 595 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(characterizing the “judicial process as the ultimate authority in interpreting the
Constitution”).
50
Jack Rakove comments that the jury system and political representation constitute
the two rights of “preeminent importance” for early Americans. JACK N. RAKOVE,
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primary constraint on judicial abuse. Elbridge Gerry urged the adoption
of a civil jury mandate in the Constitution out of the “necessity of Juries
to guard [against] corrupt judges.”51 Alexander Hamilton affirmed
Gerry’s sentiment in Number 83 of the Federalist Papers, emphasizing
the principal usefulness of juries as providing “a barrier to the tyranny of
popular magistrates in a popular government.”52 The Federal Farmer
portrayed the jury as a lower house of the judiciary such that if judges
tried to “subvert the laws, and change the forms of government” juries
would “check them, by deciding against their opinions and
determinations.53 Jack Rakove remarked that the jury system enjoyed
such esteem at the close of the eighteenth century that early Americans
believed full operation of the right to a jury and right to representation
“would shelter nearly all the other rights and liberties of the people.”54
Juries earned their esteem. The Zenger Trial marked the shining
moment of juries in colonial America.55 The case arose in 1735 when
the Governor of New York, William Cosby, arrested John Peter Zenger
on the charge of “seditious libel” for printing a criticism of Cosby.56 To
guarantee a favorable outcome, Cosby suspended a political enemy as
chief justice of New York and replaced him with a more cooperative
ally.57 The new chief justice tried twice unsuccessfully to convince a

ORIGINAL MEANING: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 293
(1960).
51
II THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 587 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
52
THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 229 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981).
Hamilton elaborated that the jury earned his “high estimation” because it provided
“security against corruption in the judiciary.” Id. But see THE FEDERALIST No. 65
(Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981) (“[J]uries are frequently influenced by
the opinions of judges. They are sometimes induced to find special verdicts, which refer
to the main question to the decision of the court. Who would be willing to stake his life
and his estate upon the verdict of a jury acting under the auspices of judges who had
predetermined his guilt?”).
53
Letters from the Federal Farmer (XV), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 315, 320 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). Alexander Hamilton echoed this
view of juries as the “lower house” of the judiciary when he denied that the
Constitution’s grant of “jurisdiction over all matters of law and fact” to the federal
judiciary would permit judges to overturn juries. THE FEDERALIST No. 81. at 43
(Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981).
54
RAKOVE, supra note 50, at 293.
55
The case earned enough notoriety that James Alexander’s report of the trial (Brief
Narrative) was reprinted fifteen times before the close of the century.
56
See JOHN ANDREW DOYLE, ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA: THE COLONIES UNDER
THE HOUSE OF HANOVER 130 (1907).
57
Id. at 130–31.

2009]

ELIGIBILITY QUALIFICATIONS

67

grand jury to indict Zenger, advising the jury that “it is time to break
[heavy, half-witted men of rhyming] when they grow abusive, insolent,
and mischievous with it.”58 Yet the grand jury rebuked the heavy hand
of the judge, and Cosby proceeded without them, ordering Zenger’s
arrest through a procedural alternative. The trial at this point attracted
ample publicity, and famed lawyer Andrew Hamilton traveled from
Philadelphia to defend Zenger.59 In the public’s eye and governor’s
sights, the jury fully acquitted Zenger.
The verdict itself was momentous, but perhaps its greatest effect lay
in its value as precedent that this ambitious colony could use against
abuse of both executive and judicial power.60 Juries began to
systematically rebuke English orders.61 Because juries would not convict
smugglers, for example, English customs officials tried to give customs
jurisdiction solely to judges, and this move garnered vociferous
complaints that England had deprived Americans of their fundamental
right to a jury trial.62 The complaints culminated in the Declaration of
Independence’s condemnation of the king and Parliament for attempting
to “depriv[e] us, in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury.”63
Perhaps the best testament to the founding generation’s faith in the
jury system lies in America’s founding legal texts. Article III explicitly64
and implicitly65 safeguards the role of juries in the American judiciary.
But these guarantees did not satisfy Anti-Federalists, who spearheaded
the push to include more jury protections in the Bill of Rights.66 And the
58
LIVINGSTON RUTHERFORD, JOHN PETER ZENGER, HIS PRESS, HIS TRIAL AND A
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ZENGER IMPRINTS 39 (1941).
59
Id. at 69.
60
Governeur Morris once described the Zenger Trial as “the germ of American
freedom, the morning star of that liberty which subsequently revolutionized America.”
Id. at 131.
61
JONAKAIT, supra note 29, at 32. For example England’s seditious libel laws were
effectively repealed by American juries that refused to convict their fellow citizens under
the law. Id.
62
Id. at 14.
63
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 15 (U.S. 1776).
64
U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury. . . .”).
65
The Constitution only grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over “all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a
State shall be Party. . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 2. One scholar has argued that
Article III’s limit on original jurisdiction of the highest court functioned to preserve the
juries’ role in deciding questions of fact and credibility in common-law cases. AMAR,
supra note 3, at 219–33.
66
1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 64 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (explaining
that the Anti-Federalists considered the trial by jury the most important procedural right
omitted from the originally ratified Constitution).
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Bill of Rights amply reflects this effort; the jury system is featured in the
Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendments,67 but its absence also strongly
influences the judge-restricting doctrines in the First, Fourth and Eighth
Amendments.68
The constitutions of the original thirteen states place even greater
emphasis on the essential role of juries in a well-functioning judiciary.
Every state constitution at the time of the federal constitution’s
ratification included provisions guaranteeing a right to a jury trial. These
constitutions placed even stronger jury protections than their federal
counterpart. The North Carolina Constitution, for example, emphatically
provides for absolute jury protections in all criminal and civil cases and
in impeachment proceedings against the governor.69 The United States
Constitution, in contrast, merely guarantees a right to a jury trial in all
criminal cases.70
Structured as complements rather than substitutes, federal and state
constitutions’ incorporation of juries into America’s judicial organs
erected a formidable barrier to judicial abuse. With strong jury
protections, the Framers had powerful reassurance that “the people”
could curb the excesses of the new Article III judiciary.71 But the
67

US CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury. . . .”);
id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed....”); id. at amend VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law.”).
68
AKIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 96 (1998) (explaining that the lack of jury
protections in these three amendments bolstered the need for other procedural protections
in America’s courtrooms).
69
N.C. CONST. § IX (“That no freeman shall be convicted of any crime, but by the
unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful men, in open court, as heretofore used.”);
id. § XIV (“That in all controversies at law, respecting property, the ancient mode of trial,
by jury, is one of the best securities of the rights of the people, and ought to remain
sacred and inviolable.”); id. §XXIII (“That the Governor, and other officers, offending
against the State, by violating any part of this Constitution, mal-administration, or
corruption, may be prosecuted, on the impeachment of the General Assembly, or
presentment of the Grand Jury of any court of supreme jurisdiction in this State.”).
70
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury. . . .”).
71
Jeremiah Black argued that the jury system “is the best protection for innocence
and the surest mode of punishing guilt that has yet been discovered.” Ex parte Milligan,
71 U.S. 2 (1866). Black continues, “[the jury system] has borne the test of a longer
experience, and borne it better than any other legal institution that ever existed among
men.” Id.
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Framers’ familiarity with juries checking judicial corruption contrasts
sharply with the relatively unprecedented federal executive and
legislature. In establishing the presidency, the Framers bore a novel task:
erecting a republican head of government. At the close of the eighteenth
century, the Framers were embarking on unchartered territory, with the
tyrannical King George as the most salient example of a national
executive.
Similarly, although to a lesser degree, the Framers had little positive
experience with national legislatures.72 England’s Parliament was widely
viewed as a pawn of the Crown.73 According to John Joseph Wallis, at
the time of the American Revolution, England’s executive controlled
nearly half of the House of Commons through various patronage
systems.74 In Common Sense, Thomas Paine described the British
Constitution as consisting of the “base remains of two ancient tyrannies:”
“the remains of monarchical tyranny in the person of the king,” and “the
remains of aristocratical tyranny in the persons of the peers,”
“compounded with some new republican materials” in the House of
Commons.75
Hence, the Framers included eligibility qualifications in the first
two Articles to guard against monarchial, lineal rule in this brave new
republican government. Because the Framers were familiar with the
effectiveness of the jury against judicial corruption, the need for added
protections against judicial abuse may have appeared less pressing.76

72

Thomas Bradbury Chandler stoked fears that a federal legislature in America
would devolve into the English version, writing that, “[a]n American House of Lords is in
agitation,” to be composed of hereditary “orders of the American nobility.” THOMAS
BRADBURY CHANDLER, WHAT THINK YE OF THE CONGRESS NOW? 34–35 (1775)
(emphasis in original); see also JOHN R. ALDEN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 163 (1989) (describing resistance to the “corruption of Parliament by the
King. . . .”).
73
John Joseph Wallis, The Concept of Systematic Corruption in American History, in
CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 23, 33
(Edward Ludwig Glaeser & Claudia Dale Goldin eds., 2006) (describing how the Stuart
government’s creation of a professional standing army threatened the independence of
Parliament by filling the House of Commons with soldiers whose careers depended on
the executive’s patronage); HENRY ST. JOHN BOLINGBROKE, POLITICAL WRITINGS 92, 93–
94 (David Armitage ed., 1997) (characterizing the views of parliament as an instrument
of the executive).
74
Wallis, supra note 73, at 33.
75
THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 50 (Edward Larkin, ed., 2004).
76
C.f. WILLIAM D. POPKIN, EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION: INSTITUIONAL AND
INDIVIDUAL STYLES 54, 55 (2007) (explaining that the Articles of Confederation did not
have a strong system of federal courts).
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The utility of juries as a check on judicial tyranny, however, should
not be overstated. The Framers appreciated the lingering danger of abuse
in jury-constrained judges. In explaining why courts should not preside
over presidential impeachments, Alexander Hamilton noted that even a
jury safeguard would be inadequate to guard against judicial misfeasance
in impeachment of the president since “juries are frequently influenced
by the opinions of judges.”77 Notwithstanding this inevitable weakness
in juries’ ability to protect the president from jealous impeachment,
jurors generally serve as an effective constraint against judicial abuse.
The “Technocratic” Judiciary
The Framer’s vision of the technocratic role of the judiciary may
also contribute to the omission of eligibility qualifications. Natural Law
dominated eighteenth century jurisprudence.78 Many years before the
skepticism of the “legal realism” movement won favor, law was viewed
as a science with judges acting as quasi-scientists dedicated to the
discovery and application of coherent legal absolutes.79 Faced with
77

THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 226 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981).
Hamilton continues, “[J]uries are sometimes induced to find special verdicts, which refer
the main question to the decision of the court. Who would be willing to stake his life and
his estate upon the verdict of a jury acting under the auspices of judges who had
predetermined his guilt?” Id.
78
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 227 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield
ed., 1981) (arguing that judges properly function “neither [through] FORCE nor WILL,
but merely [through] judgment”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180
(1803) (“How immoral to impose [an oath] upon [judges], if they were used as the
instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to support?);
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE “HIGHER LAW” BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 5 (2008) (“The Ninth Amendment . . . illustrates [a theory of an essential and
unchanging justice not dependent on any will] perfectly except that the principles of
transcendental justice have been here translated into terms of personal and private
rights.”); JOHN JOSEPH POWELL, 1 ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND
AGREEMENTS 52 (1790) (“[R]ights . . . should . . . depend upon certain and fixed
principles of law, and not upon rules and constructions of equity. . . .”). But see Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70 (1947) (asserting that a natural law approach to
constitutional interpretation would “degrade the constitutional safeguards of the bill of
rights and simultaneously appropriate for this Court a broad power which we are not
authorized by the Constitution to exercise”); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE 74 (1991)
(pointing out that some eighteenth century lawyers disfavored natural law insofar as it
was too amorphous to ground laws or rights).
79
See WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 8 (James Appleton Morgan
ed., Burt Franklin 1971) (1878) (“The law [is] a science which requires laborious study to
comprehend it; and without a body of men trained to the task, and capable of applying it,
the rights of all would be set afloat—tossed on a wide sea of arbitrary, fluctuating, and
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complaints over his nomination of John Marshall as chief justice, John
Adams responded that Marshall’s “reading in the science [of law] is
fresh in his head.”80 The Framers thus envisioned members of the
judiciary as highly trained, field-specific experts.81
The requirement that judges have “very special talents” limited the
pool of qualified candidates and thereby raised search costs for able
judges.82 The Framers appreciated these costs and were willing to take
measures they thought necessary to lower them. In Number 78 of The
Federalist Papers, for example, Alexander Hamilton argued that Article
III needed to guarantee life tenure to attract to the bench the “few men in
society who will have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the
stations of judges.”83 Likewise, the removal of eligibility qualifications
was an effective way to clear the path for the best jurists to enter the
judiciary.

contradictory decisions.”); see also Black and White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown,
276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (describing the prevailing view in 1789
of common law as “a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but
obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute”). The twentieth century
occasioned a “significant rethinking of the role of federal courts” where the “general
practice [of judges] has been to look for legislative guidance before exercising innovative
authority over substantive law.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 694–95 (2004).
80
DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 560 (2001). One scholar comments that until
the Brown v. Board of Education decision, “the rule of law . . . throughout the nineteenth
century . . . [was] a baseline that courts administered until the people changed it.”
William E. Nelson, The Historical Foundations of the American Judiciary, in THE
JUDICIAL BRANCH 3 (Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2006).
81
See, e.g., THE DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 188
(Jonathan Elliot ed., Taylor & Maury 1845) (Madison, J.) (objecting to the judicial
appointment “by the whole legislature” because they “are incompetent judges of the
requisite qualifications” and would favor those to whom the favors were owed but who
lacked “any of the essential qualifications for an expositor of the laws”).
82
Chief Justice of a Unified Court, Selecting and Retiring Judges: Why Popular
Election Results in Dissatisfaction—Improvement Through Separate Retirement
Elections—Appointment, 3 J. AMER. JUDICATURE SOCIETY 165, 165 (1920). A metaphor
of the time provided that just like very few people can engineer a bridge upon which
thousands cross each day, few people possess the technical skill to pass “upon the rights
to life, liberty and property of thousands of citizens.” Id.
83
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 226 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981).
From a modern perspective, the trade-off in attracting a different pool of potential judges
by eliminating life tenure may yield dividends by shifting the understanding of the
judicial role away from glamorous policymaking towards the “more mundane, recorddriven activity of applying fact to law.” Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and
Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 639
(2005).

72

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 6:55

A Popular Buffer
The judiciary’s removal from democratic pressures may also have
decreased, rather than increased, the need for eligibility qualifications in
the view of the Framers. Eligibility qualifications indirectly enhance
democratic goals by directly subverting democratic choice. The age
minimum constitutes one example of this democratic trade-off. Even if
America’s populace would otherwise vote someone below the age of
thirty-five into America’s highest office, the Framers concern with lineal
succession as embodied in the age minimum predominates over the
people’s will.
Article III’s nomination by the president and confirmation by the
Senate creates an analogous buffer from potentially counterproductive
democratic choice, which may lessen the need for eligibility
qualifications. In debates over the appointment of the judiciary, the
Framers conceded that the unique nature of judging84 required some
removal from democratic pressures.85 For this reason, the Framers
limited confirmation to the “advise and consent” of the Senate alone, and
removed the House of Representatives—the most populist federal
body—from the formal process of selecting federal judges.86 James
Madison emphasized this design by describing members of the House of
Representatives as “incompetent judges of the requisite qualifications”
for federal judges.87 Hence, the Framers may have preferred avoiding
the over-inclusive eligibility qualifications88 where the appointment
process and nature of the judiciary included ready-made restraints on
popular will.
IV. TWO CENTURIES LATER: AN APPRAISAL
Regardless of why the Framers omitted eligibility qualifications
from Article III, experience confirms the omission did not undermine
84

THE FEDERALIST No. 78 at 226, 233 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed.,
1981) (claiming that “there can be but few men in society who will have sufficient skill in
the laws to qualify them for the stations of judges.”).
85
See Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and
Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 972 (2007).
86
Id.
87
5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 188 (Debate of June
13, 1787) (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington D.C., Taylor & Maury 1845). Madison
continued to claim that Congressmen would likely favor those they had some connections
to but who lacked “any of the essential qualifications for an expositor of the laws.” Id.
88
After all, age, birth-citizenship, and residency provisions remain blunt instruments
to advance democratic goals.

2009]

ELIGIBILITY QUALIFICATIONS

73

republican meritocratic values.89 Judges working when they are too old
poses a much bigger problem than judges working when they are too
young.90 Out of all three branches, the judiciary likely has proportionally
the fewest corruption scandals and strains of nepotism.91 Judicial
appointments have evolved from dynastic beginnings to a highly
meritocratic, albeit partisan, process. As a result, many figures of the
federal judiciary in the twentieth century, whether appointed by
Democratic or Republican administrations, emerged from humble
backgrounds.92
The few twentieth-century federal judges with influential familial
ties also happen to be some of the most highly regarded. Learned Hand,
for example, grew up comfortably in a family with an “almost
hereditary” attachment to the legal profession.93 As an appellate judge,
Hand gained ever more prominence “not because of his standing in the
judicial hierarchy, but because of the clarity of thought and the cogency
of reasoning that shape[d his opinions].”94 Hand’s cousin Augustus
89

But see Sanford Levinson, Contempt of Court: The Most Important ‘Contemporary
Challenge’ to Judging, 49 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 339, 342 (1992) (arguing that the 1992
Supreme Court lacked anyone with impressive public service credentials, especially
when compared with the Court in 1954 that decided Brown v. Board of Education).
90
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Steven G. Calabresi, Term Limits for the High
Court, WASH. POST., Aug. 9, 2002, at A23 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s seniority
system “encourages justices to stay past their prime”); John O. McGinnis, Justice Without
Juries, 16 CONST. COMM. 541, 543 (1999) (speculating that term limits on the Supreme
Court would have “curtailed the effects of senility and the excessive delegation of power
to young and energetic law clerks by reducing the temptation to cling to the bench into
very old age”). Ironically, some evidence suggests presidents, seeking to maximize their
power over the court’s composition, seek to appoint younger judges that will presumably
have longer terms given the life tenure guarantee. See, e.g., DWIGHT EISENHOWER, THE
WHITE HOUSE YEARS: MANDATE FOR CHANGE 1953–1956, at 227 (1963) (detailing how
President Eisenhower set an age maximum for Justices of sixty-two years); RICHRAD
HODDER-WILLIAMS, THE POLITICS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 183–85 (1980)
(documenting that Justice William O. Douglas’s youth was an important factor in his
appointment and achievement of longest tenure in Supreme Court history).
91
One scholar quips that the few corrupt federal judges “eventually get their just
deserts and join Congress.” Saikrishna B. Prakash, America’s Aristocracy, 109 YALE L.J.
531, 531 (1999).
92
See, e.g., EARL M. MALTZ, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF WARREN BURGER, 1969–
1986, at 14–15, 17–18 (2000) (describing the modest childhoods of late-Justices William
Orville Douglas, Thurghood Marshall, Harry A. Blackmun, and Byron White); RICHARD
A. BRISBIN, JR., JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL 12 (1998)
(describing Justice Scalia’s school years in a middle-class immigrant neighborhood in
Queens, New York).
93
KATHRYN GRIFFITH, JUDGE LEARNED HAND AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3 (1973).
94
GERALD GUNTER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 574 (1994) (citing
editorial, “Judges’ Judge,” Washington Post, 28 January 1947, 8). The Harvard Law
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joined him on the Second Circuit, and independently established himself
as an excellent jurist, inspiring the adage to “quote Learned, but follow
Gus.”95 Likewise, yet with perhaps less distinction than the Hands, the
Arnold brothers served together on the Eighth Circuit and individually
earned reputations as fit and able judges.96
Whether due more to prescience or serendipity, the absence of
eligibility qualifications in Article III appears prudent in hindsight. The
rationales underlying the residency, birth-citizenship, and age
requirements would gain little traction in a modern debate about
reforming the judiciary.97 Although debates about the proper judicial
philosophy and background remain robust, largely absent from the
discussion are charges of nepotism or incompetence. History has thus
confirmed the wisdom of the Framers in leaving the president and Senate
full discretion in selecting Article III judges.

Review also devoted a section of an entire article to praise its then-living alumnus in
1947. 60 HARV. L. REV. 325 (1947).
95
Michael E. Solimine, The Judiciary and Nepotism, 71 U. CIN. L. Rev. 563 (2004).
Solimine argues further that the Hand cousin’s relationship may have also created
“considerable, positive synergies” in their working together. Id.
96
Id.
97
Debates over the rules governing the composition of America’s courts continue
today. Many within legal academia have recently urged congressional action to install a
“system of rotation to assure some regularity of change in the composition of the
[Supreme] Court.” Letter from Paul D. Carrington, Roger C. Cramton, Daniel J. Meador
& Alan R. Morrison to AAAL Fellows (July 14, 2009), 4 (1999).

